# Why War?

# **Courtenay Young**

#### ABSTRACT

This essay is an attempt to answer a fundamental question about the aberrant human behaviour of war or warfare. There are very few examples of such behaviour in the animal kingdom, hence the word "aberrant." The human animal is possibly the only animal on the planet that conducts sustained aggression (warfare) against others of its own species. There are many examples of anger or rage, and even of other aberrant behaviours (like abuse) but sustained and directed rage against other groupings of the same species is incredibly rare, if not unique. Why is this?

Keywords: war, warfare, origins, palaeontology, neolithic

Submitted: 27.08.2022 Accepted: 15.10.2022 International Body Psychotherapy Journal The Art and Science of Somatic Praxis Volume 21, Number 2, Winter 2023, pp. 13-22 ISSN 2169-4745 Printing, ISSN 2168-1279 Online © Author and USABP/EABP. Reprints and permissions: secretariat@eabp.org

... we can see the naturalistic beginnings of an "us" and "them" – the differentiation necessary to justify the killing of "others".



## hat is War?

The Oxford English Dictionary defines "war" as:

- 1. A state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country.
- 2. A state of competition or hostility between different people or groups.
- 3. A sustained campaign against an undesirable situation or activity.

Wars have seemingly been a part of human history for thousands of years, and have become increasingly destructive. As Ferrill (1985) reminds us, war is not a modern invention. Although modern warfare has become incredibly prevalent, especially in recent centuries, wars have been with us since (at least) the Stone Age. It seems that at some point in the dawn of human prehistory, early human societies adapted techniques and weapons originally developed for hunting animals towards fighting other people. Why?

#### The First Evidence of War

When modern humans (Cro-Magnons) emerged about 40,000-50,000 years ago, they were sufficiently adaptable to survive the last Ice Age, which peaked about 18,000-20,000 years ago before it gave way to the interglacial Holocene epoch about 11,500 years ago. During this Holocene period, humans were able to take advantage of the warmer weather to develop agricultural and domestication techniques. This interglacial period, which continues to this day, affected northern latitudes much more than equatorial regions.

Unfortunately, those hotter, more equatorial regions have a poorer archaeological record. Since the peak of the Ice Age, global sea levels have also risen by as much as 400 feet. This sort of increase is responsible for hiding evidence of any coastal developments and artifacts.<sup>[1]</sup>

It must also be remembered that another protohuman species, the Neanderthals, had lived in similar areas, especially in Europe. They lived from approximately 400,000 years to 40,000 years ago (BCE).<sup>[2]</sup> Neanderthal technology was quite sophisticated. It included the Mousterian [3] flint stonetool industry, as well as the ability to create fire, build cave hearths, make adhesive birch bark tar, craft simple clothing (like wraps, blankets, and ponchos), weave, make use of medicinal plants (as well as treat severe injuries), store food, and use various cooking techniques such as roasting, boiling, and smoking. Neanderthals also made use of a wide array of hunted food, mainly hoofed mammals, and also ate other megafauna, plants, small mammals, birds, and aquatic and marine resources. Although they were probably apex predators, they still had to compete with cave bears, cave lions, cave hyaenas, and other large predators. They mainly lived in natural caves. They disappeared shortly after we (Cro-Magnons) emerged about 40,000 years ago, despite having existed for several hundred thousand years. Therefore, the transition of the dominant human species from Neanderthal to Cro-Magnon is possibly very significant. The Neanderthal's slightly larger brain capacity, devoted more towards vision and physical control, did not seem to encourage higher-order thinking; they thus began to lose out when competing with the more modern, more adaptable Cro-Magnons (Pearce, Stringer, & Dunbar, 2013). They never invented written language or agriculture, nor did they evolve tools beyond the traditional flint Stone Age versions.

It is, perhaps, too easy to assume that there was competition not only for food, shelter, and natural resources between the two species, but there was also possible conflict. There is no clear archaeological evidence for such conflict, but this does not preclude the possibility that early warfare – due to the pressure of competition for similar resources – started then, about 40,000 years ago.

It may also be possible that the implications of potential genocide by our ancestors are so unpalatable that such evidence can be conveniently overlooked. However, there is also some DNA evidence of interbreeding, mostly confined to Europe and Asia, where Neanderthals lived (but much less in Africa) – though it is quite possible that such "mixed" offspring were less viable, or less socially acceptable, so their lineage may have died out rather quickly.

### **Early Natural Aggression?**

There is some evidence that some of the earlier hominids (*H. Australopithecus* (3.5 - 3 mya), who were fairly widespread throughout Eastern and Southern Africa, may have been quite aggressive. Some of the (his)story of other hominid species that evolved in different branches – *H. Habilis* (2.3 - 1.6 mya) and *H. Erectus* (1.8 - 0.3 mya) – is very patchy. At some point in this early period, hominids like *H. Erectus* might have started to use fire. There is no proper evidence that they made any tools (other than stone hand tools) or weapons, but they may well have used animal bones as clubs.

There were, and still are, a number of controversial theories about the nature of animal aggression in early humans, but the more recent consensus is that they were probably quite peaceful. There is some evidence of aggression, as seen in skulls with holes in them, but this is not conclusive. It is pos-

<sup>1.</sup> In the last 100 years or so, 1901–2018, the global average sea level rose by 15–25 cm (6–10 in).

<sup>2.</sup> BCE: Before the Common Era.

<sup>3.</sup> Mousterian refers to the period when there was a stone tool-making industry, associated primarily with the Neanderthals in Europe and the Levant, and the earliest anatomically modern humans in Europe, North Africa, and West Asia. It began around the end of the Middle Palaeolithic era, and represented quite a technological leap forward as stone tools were shaped into points, flakes, blades, and cores.

sible to theorize that there might have been some intraspecies aggression, with competition between small family groups. But given the relatively small numbers of hominids and their very widespread, distribution, the concept of 'proper' war is hardly tenable.

By the start of the last Ice Age (about 70,000 years ago), when Neanderthals were widespread, there is evidence that wooden spears were in common use. But little evidence has been found that they were used against other people (such as skeletons with splintered ribcages). Actually, one Neanderthal skeleton was found with a hole in the pelvic area that might have been made by a spear, but this might have been due to a hunting accident instead. Their main tool was probably the pebble chopper, or its later development into the stone (flint) hand axe, but this is hardly a weapon of war.

There is, however, some significant evidence of spear usage from the late Palaeolithic Age (35,000 to 14,000 BCE), during the era of Cro-Magnon cave paintings. In these paintings, spear points of stone and bone are commonly illustrated, and even quite a sophisticated spear-thrower, which extended a person's forearm and gave the spear greater range, accuracy and penetrating power. However, the plethora of cave paintings reflect very little evidence of warfare.

"There are several thousand scenes of animals, and, on the whole, they are idyllically peaceful. Only, about 130 depictions altogether may be of men – the figures are too crudely drawn to permit certainty – and a few of the men ... seem to be dead or dying from wounds. Still, most of the 130 anthropomorphs are shown in peaceful scenes." (Ferrill, p. 17).

"Of all the palaeolithic cave paintings, only one illustrates what may be arrows, but there are no depictions are bows, and the 'arrows', if they are not male sex-symbols, as many believe, could just as easily represent spears or darts." (Ibid., p. 18)

This context suggests that at the beginning of this interglacial period, at the end of the Palaeolithic Age, and during the Mesolithic Age (Middle Stone Age, 12,000–9,000 BCE), there begins to appear some archaeological evidence of warfare. Until this point, the only potential weapons available were Stone Age spears, daggers, and clubs – all used predominantly in hunting.

However, four other types of weapons were developed during this period: the sling, the dagger (or short sword), the mace (or club), and, later, the bow and arrow. Clearly, by Neolithic times, the bow and arrow were used in hunting, and evidence suggests they were also used in warfare.

"Much more important for the history of warfare, there is evidence for the application of strategy and tactics by the beginning of Neolithic times, the use of organised troops according to plan. It is generally assumed, probably correctly, that strategy and tactics in human warfare emerged out of the complex hunting patterns of Palaeolithic man. There is considerable evidence that organized groups of men, almost certainly under the command of a leader, helped to stampede large animals over cliffs or to draw them into bogs." (Ibid., p. 20).

The availability of weapons alone does not produce war; there needs to be an underlying genetic tendency towards physical violence and aggression towards the "other" – be it tribe, race, country, or nation. In studying warfare between the Yanomamo villages in the Amazon, Chagnon (1968) concludes that competition for food, water, territory, or women creates the initial friction, but then minor bow-and-arrow confrontations ensue, escalating to a death, and then the other tribes enact their revenge in warfare. Blood vengeance then "pays off" in increased social status and reproductive success. This sort of anthropological pattern can be seen in several other societies, both animal and human, such as the 19th century Cheyenne Indians.

Ember & Ember (1994), who analysed anthropological descriptions of 186 non-industrial societies, offered a tentative theory of war (at least in such "simple" societies) in that the most warlike seem to express considerably more fear of food shortages caused by expected but unpredictable natural disasters, such as drought, flood, or infestations. The fear of others further fuels the tendency to "fight-or-flight." Parents in war-prone societies encourage toughness and aggression in boys. However, this is fuelled by war, rather than causing it.

It seems that human-on-human warfare had become well-established by the Neolithic (10,000 – c. 3,000 BCE), with the establishment of fixed human settlements and the beginnings of agriculture, and particularly with the development of bows and ar-



**Neolithic cave paintings from the Spanish Levant showing hunters with bows and arrows** 1) organized in a deer hunt; 2) in a column of (mostly) men, with a designated leader (with headdress); 3) in a file, possibly executing another person with arrows; and 4) with four warriors attacking three others, flanking them on two sides. (Source: Ferrill, pp. 20-22)

rows. This somewhat contradicts the theory that early humans might have developed warfare by exterminating the Neanderthals some several thousand years earlier.

Certain Neolithic paintings from the Spanish Levant depict: (a) warriors attacking a herd of deer; (b) warriors carrying bows and arrows, marching in a column with a leader differentiated by a headdress; (c) a possible "execution," with archers organized into a firing line, presumably firing on command at a separated body with arrows in it; and (d) four warriors attacking three others, flanking them on both sides (though this might have been a spontaneous rather than planned strategic act, such as in war).

There is further definitive archaeological evidence of a prehistoric massacre in northern Sudan, with skeletons dating back about 13,000-14,000 years. <sup>[4]</sup> Apparent evidence also exists of another warlike situation with numerous 10,000-year-old human remains at Nataruk, in Turkana, Kenya, on the shores of a lake. All of these evidential records relate to events that occurred long before any oral or written history.

<sup>4.</sup> The earliest site of a war is at Jebel Sahaba, with the conflict apparently between the Natufians and the Qadan cultures, in the wake of an early ecological crisis.

However, we have several written accounts of early warfare, like the story of Gilgamesh, the hero-king of ancient Mesopotamia (approximately 4,000 BCE, though written later), or earlier parts of the Bible, like the book of Exodus, which records how Moses leads the Israelites out of slavery in Egypt, through the deserts of Sinai, and to their "holy war" – the conquest of Canaan (the Promised Land). These events took place perhaps around 1,300–1,250 BCE. The epic Hindu stories of the Mahabharata, which took place around 900 BCE) are included in the Ramayana (written around 500 BCE).

#### **Reasons for War**

For a long time, there were two main anthropological theories about why humans go to war. These can be labelled as cultural ecology and cultural materialism <sup>[5]</sup> on the one hand, and as several other "-isms" on the other. The latter tended to offer explanations referring to social dynamics, differing ideologies, or other non-material factors.

"Some materialists argued that societies undertake warfare only when forced to do so by competition over food or other essential resources. Peace is [therefore] the inertial or natural state to which societies revert when essential material needs can be cheaply supplied by nonviolent means. (Keeley, 1996)

These theories essentially posit that such primitive societies only went to war under conditions of threat and/or opportunities for material advantage. However, these are essentially developments of the now refuted "noble savage" concept. The archaeological evidence suggests that the prehistorical tactics of warfare favoured raids and ambushes – as opposed to formal battles, which often yielded a high deathrate. Adult males falling into the hands of their enemies were almost universally killed, and surprise raids seldom spared even women and children. But the perennial question still remains: what causes war? Humans are social animals, and, as such, gather together in groups: these can initially be small extended family groups that collect together into larger social groupings, settlements or villages. There is some evidence that warfare happens, even at this early stage, long before people got together in towns, cities, or countries. War is therefore a feature of early social groupings, going back tens of thousands of years. When and how did it start?

There is some good evidence that chimpanzees conduct deliberate raids of neighbouring communities, and that this can lead to the annexation of territory. However, Nicholas Newton-Fisher [6] feels that this type of behaviour is more akin to the raiding of a guerrilla band, rather than a planned and executed battle. So, the potential for aggressive group behaviour can be traced back as far as our animal origins - even though modern chimpanzees are more like distant animalistic cousins (with only about 4% difference to our DNA). Various other animal groups do compete over resources, sometimes in an organized way, but "war" implies something more organized.<sup>[7]</sup> Unlike humans, chimpanzees and other large primates don't seem to form into opposing armies, nor do two communities ally to defeat a third. So, the potential for aggression seems to be part of our animalistic nature; goodbye to Rousseau's concept of the Noble Savage.

However, if we go back into what we know of our history, our first designated "enemies" were probably the Neanderthals, and the reasons for warfare with them would probably have been over the first homesteads and hunting grounds, originally occupied and used by the Neanderthals, and then taken over several thousands of years later by the Cro-Magnon incomers. Here, we can see the naturalistic beginnings of an "us" and "them" – the differentiation necessary to justify the killing of "others". If the others are different, then they can be a threat. This triggers a fear reaction, which

<sup>5.</sup> Cultural ecology is the adaptation of a culture to a specific environment; cultural materialism is the relationships between the physical and economic aspects of a particular society, and the values and beliefs that predominate in that society.

<sup>6.</sup> Nicholas Newton-Fisher is a primate behavioral ecologist at the University of Kent. He was quoted in a National Geographic article by Liz Langley (January 30, 2016).

<sup>7.</sup> This article does not consider insects as animals. There is good evidence of insects, like wasps and ants, conducting "war" on other colonies.

takes us easily towards Sam Keen's theories about how we might need to demonize the "enemy" so as to justify killing him.<sup>[8]</sup>

It is therefore possible to theorize a connection between:

- a. The development of weapons (especially those that distance us from our prey/enemies) and coordinated hunting strategies.
- b. Natural, protective aggression towards competing social groups.
- c. The beginnings of all-out war against "others."

Yet the various Stone Ages (Palaeolithic, Mesolithic, and Neolithic), having lasted several million years, ended somewhere about 5,000 BCE, at the end of the last Ice Age, with significant climate change and rising sea levels.

During this period of change and hiatus, people began to develop agriculture, permanent settlements, and animal husbandry. This first began in the fertile regions of the Middle East (Mesopotamia, between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers), the Indus valley, the Nile valley, and the Yellow River valley in China. This period was followed by the far more technological Bronze Age, which began around 4,000 BCE, when bronze (a more resilient alloy of copper and tin) was discovered and used for weapons, tools, and jewellery. Food surpluses generated wealth, early cities were built, and trade developed. And so – inevitably – did greed, envy, and war.

More modern theories about reasons (or justifications) for war include those of Bennett and Stam (2009), who conducted a thorough empirical appraisal of the plethora of theories, conjectures, and hypotheses about conflict, and concluded that a single theory is not helpful in understanding actual behaviour. They instead focused on what sets of theories seem valid, which required an appropriate research design for such an analysis. However, they tended to focus on the different origins of modern war, such as democratization, polity change and the externalization of violence, alliances and membership in defence pacts, arms races, balances of power in non-directed dyads, conventional deterrents, democratic peace agreements, expected utilities, geographic contiguities, nuclear deterrence, transitions of power, trade interdependence, economic cycles, systemic power concentrations and movements, dangerous dyads, and combined effects. They also point out that, despite enhanced understanding from these analyses, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective, there has been no reduction in, or elimination of, the scourge – or pox – of war; it almost has an infectious quality. However, these more modern theories seem to accept warfare as being almost inevitable.

Eventually, on October 24, 1945, at the end of the Second World War, the United Nations Charter came into force in an attempt to prevent disputes from escalating into wars, to help restore peace following the outbreak of armed conflicts, and – ideally – to promote lasting peace in societies emerging from war. While the UN provides a unique platform for countries to meet each other in an open forum, and may have helped end some conflicts and foster reconciliation by conducting successful peacekeeping operations in dozens of countries, including Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia, and Tajikistan, there have also been about 60 interstate wars since 1945,<sup>[9]</sup> so its success is somewhat limited.

There are approximately 200 countries in the world today. All their wars or conflicts are the source of immense human suffering and regional instability. Besides killing people, wars and conflicts destroy property, displace people, disrupt production of food, goods, and services, and create violence and disorder.

These wars have included the Indo-Pakistani war (1947), Arab-Israeli war (1948), Korean war (1950-53), Vietnam war (1955-75), Suez crisis (1956), Israeli Six-Day war (1967), Yom Kippur war (1973), the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974), Cambodian-Vietnamese war (1975-1989), Somali Ogaden war (1977-78), Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Falklands war (1982), the invasion of Grenada (983), the US invasion of Panama (1989-90), the Gulf war (1990-1991), the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (1999), the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001), the invasion of Iraq (2003),

<sup>8.</sup> Keen, S. (1986). Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

<sup>9.</sup> Interstate wars since 1945: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\_of\_interstate\_wars\_since\_1945

the Russo-Georgian war (2008), the "military intervention" in Libya (2011), the Russo-Ukrainian war (2014-now) and the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022). Estimated combat deaths since 1945 total between about five million (minimum) and about ten million (maximum); these figures do not include any civilian casualties.<sup>[10]</sup>

The above list of so-called "interstate wars" does not include so-called "civil" wars fought between organized groups within the same state or country; these total about 450 since 1945, including armed conflicts, wars of independence, coups, and insurrections, with about 30 currently ongoing civil wars. These numbers do not include protests and terrorist incidents. It is almost impossible to enumerate the numbers of people killed in such civil wars.

Many people flee such conflicts, as we have recently seen, particularly in Syria and the Ukraine. The UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) estimates that there are currently well over 90 million people displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations, or events seriously disturbing public order.<sup>[11]</sup> This figure does not include economic migrants.

The nature and type of this human-made disaster (called war) has also been changing in recent times. In addition to direct fighting between countries, there is an increasing incidence of conflicts becoming internal, within countries. This trend results in much higher civilian casualties, with the use of terror to exert social control, if necessary by disrupting the fabric of grassroots social, economic, and cultural relations (Bracken et al., 1998). A good example of this is the present conflict in the Ukraine, with the Russian emphasis on the destruction of cities. The sum total of human misery all these conflicts entail is therefore appalling; as a species, we are inflicting this tragedy on ourselves (Somasundaram, 2006). There has to be some deeply serious pathology at work, or else - as a species - we are just totally insane, hell-bent on self-destruction.

However, before any further and deeper explorations are undertaken about the causes and motivations of war, there also needs to be some consideration about the impact of trauma, possible transgenerational trauma, and especially the perpetuation of traumatization through warfare.

A number of researchers have specifically identified some of the impacts of war and trauma, mostly on non-combatant civilians – the bystanders, the collaterally damaged, the tragic casualties. These researchers include Rathi (n.d.); Murthy & Lakshminarayana (2006); Raam & Balasubramaniam (2020); and Musisi & Kinyanda (2020). These articles make for dire reading, and is perhaps a bit like identifying the problem after the event. The problem is that human beings create war (frequently) and also suffer from it (massively). The question that no one seems able to answer is why.

#### Treatment

Before we jump in and try to help, let us take a wider perspective; otherwise, we are just applying a very small bandage to a huge wound. No individual, or any small group, will properly be able to counteract the global effect of wars. Attempts are being made – within the United Nations, by health professionals in reports, and by documentation and publications – to raise a consistent voice for peace. Unfortunately, the power of the arms lobby and arms industry, as well as the rattle of machine guns and the explosion of bombs, tend to drown out these calls for peace. Global military expenditure on arms is about \$550 billion (or about 4–5% of world GDP), split between "home use" and "exports."

The arms trade (selling weapons to other countries) is valued at about \$100 billion annually. The US exports about \$10 billion annually in arms expenditure (first at about 45%); Russia about \$3,200 million; France about \$2,000 million; Germany and Spain about \$1,200 million each.<sup>[12]</sup> These figures do not include "military aid" – gifts to other countries. A clear fact emerges here: our major industrial countries are making much too much

<sup>10.</sup> The above totals do not include any figures for the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001).

<sup>11.</sup> www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html: plus about five million people from the Ukraine in 2022.

<sup>12.</sup> Figures from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

money out of warfare to stop. Swords into ploughshares doesn't really compute; neither does missile launchers into windfarms!

So, if we can't stop war, then we should first examine how people naturally survive, and have survived, to date. What are the various resilience-building approaches of different communities and cultures, and how do they affect psychological healing of children, as well as adults, in the aftermath of war and destruction? Just as we don't have the answer to "Why war?", we don't have the full answer to how to heal from war, or even to stop it. Further research, Rathi claims, is needed:

"Essential humanitarian efforts in the form of programs, resolutions, conventions, campaigns, and interventions, by various local and international NGOs and UN agencies, are addressing actual and perceived stressors with which non-combatants may be confronted. A common assumption in developed nations is that the Western ideas of psychological trauma, therapy, and healing are universal. Yet, Summerfield (1999) questions whether there is sufficient empirical evidence that Western models of mental health, medical, and technical solutions, which are targeted at providing psychological aid to distressed populations in developing regions, trump the pre-existing cultural and religious coping strategies in those countries ...

Wars are likely to continue and cause emotional distress. Additional empirical studies that focus on healing, promoting resilience, and incorporating cultural capacity builders are needed in order to provide appropriate and effective mental health services to future victims of war." (Rathi, p. 2-3)

However, the aforementioned traditional ("preexisting cultural and religious") coping strategies are almost certainly outdated and equally ineffective.

As a body psychotherapist, all of this is naturally of interest. We know that people store trauma in their bodies – not only in their muscles (Reich, 1933, 1973), but also in their soft tissues (Keleman, 1983) and in their digestive systems (Boyesen, 2022). Traumatization, however minor, tends to stay locked into the body and the psyche, and subsequent traumas just escalate the effects. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), only properly recognized in the last century, is increasingly prevalent. It affects social behaviour and well a person's physiology, and therefore treatment is quite complex. There seem to be a plethora of therapists offering relatively quick-fix solutions for trauma, but Bessel van der Kolk has said, in effect, that the only people knowledgeable enough to treat trauma effectively are body psychotherapists, because trauma is stored in the body.<sup>[13]</sup> A number of body-oriented psychotherapists seem to hold out some hope for individuals, at least. Pat Ogden, Deb Dana, Stephen Porges, Peter Levine, Dan Siegel, Babette Rothschild, Gabor Maté, Ruth Lanius, Allan Schore, Ricky Greenwald, Jan Winhall, Ken Wilber, Susan Aposhyan, and many others, all seem to offer ways to heal trauma.

Trauma is very persistent and gets locked into the body. Severe trauma in one member of a family can further traumatize others. Trauma can thus often be seen trans-generationally. Given that only one animal species indulges in warfare, is it possible that this species could have been traumatized at some point in its development, and what we now see is the phenomena of embedded trans-generational trauma in human DNA? We know that certain breeds of dogs are much more aggressive than others, so it is possible that humans have been bred (genetically) for aggression and war.

However, Liedloff (1975) claims to have found an Amazonian tribe that did not have any words for anger or aggression, where these were seen as an aberration, and a dysfunctional, pathological result of poor mothering. It might also therefore be possible to breed out aggression in humans, given time and safe social structures.

It is also possible that our views of war and aggression have been influenced by the suppression of earlier hunter-gatherer, possibly more matrilineal societies, who were less aggressive than the largescale influx of Indo-Aryan, more patrilineal and nomadic cultures that came into Europe from Asia about 3,000 years ago. Some of the early myths and

<sup>13.</sup> Van der Kolk, B. A. (2014). The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind and Body in the Healing of Trauma. New York: Penguin.

legends of Greece and Britain refer to the huge cultural shifts that happened in this era, and how the pre-existing cultures could not compete with the much more aggressive incomers. However, we are left with a legacy that seems to view war as an almost inevitable evil.

Most modern wars are initiated by governments or leaders, not by actual populations. Most of the time, they are the result of unresolved disputes over resources and land, or of a government's desire to increase its influence and power. But Steve Taylor comments "Looking back over the history of warfare, what is most striking is how willing most people have been to fight in wars, or at least to support them." He also notes: "Warfare provides people with a semblance of psychological positivity in oppressed societies where other outlets are lacking," and illustrates this with the example of how both German and British populations welcomed the outbreak of the First World War. The American psychologist, William James, once suggested that – at least the idea of – war is so prevalent because of its initial positive psychological effect.

Therefore, it seems a good idea that humans need to find activities that provide the same positive effects of warfare, but which don't involve the same levels of devastation. This might account for the growth of competitive national sports, like football. However, as we have just seen in 2022, this isn't fool-proof: the other reasons for war (as mentioned above) can, unfortunately, sometimes overwhelm us, at our peril.

I do not feel I have answered the primary question, "why war?" satisfactorily. I don't know if the answer, if there is one, would be useful. I only know that, as long as people want war, agree to go to war, support war, and pay for war, we are stuck with it.



**Courtenay Young**, is a well-known UK body psychotherapist, who originally trained with Gerda Boyesen and David Boadella (1979-1983) and has worked clinically for 40 years in many different settings. He has authored many articles and edited several books, including: *The Hand*-

book of Body Psychotherapy & Somatic Psychology; Being in the Body: The Handbook of Biosynthesis Psychotherapy (in press); and The New Collected Papers of Biodynamic Massage & Psychotherapy (in press). He has also edited a series of books under his own imprimatur, Body Psychotherapy Publications. He is currently the editor of the International Journal of Psychotherapy. His articles are available on his personal website.

Website: www.courtenay-young.com Body Psychotherapy Publications: www.bodypsychotherapypublications.com

#### REFERENCES

Bartlett, S. J. (2007). The Humanistic Psychology of Human Evil: Ernest Becker and Arthur Koestler. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 340–363.

Bennett, D. Scott, & Stam, Allan C. (2009). The Behavioral Origins of War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

**Boyesen, G. (2022).** The 'New' Collected Papers of Biodynamic Massage & Psychotherapy. Stow, Galashiels: Body Psychotherapy Publications (in press). Bracken, P. J., Petty, C., & Summerfield, D. (1998). *Rethinking the Trauma of War*. New York: Save the Children Alliance and Free Association Books.

Chagnon, N. A. (1968). Yanomamo: The Fierce People. New York: Holt McDougal

**Ember, C. R., & Ember, M. (1994).** War, socialization and interpersonal violence: a cross-cultural study. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 38(4), 6220–6246.

Ferrill, A. (1985). The Origins of War: From the Stone Age to Alexander the Great. London: Thames & Hudson.

Gat, A. (2006). War in Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keeley, L. H. (1996). War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keleman, S. (1983). Emotional Anatomy. Berkeley, CA: Center Press.

Kelly, R. C. (2000). Warless Societies and the Origin of War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Liedloff, J. (1975). The Continuum Concept. London: Arkana.

LeShan, L. (1992). The Psychology of War: Comprehending its Mystique and Madness. Chicago: Noble Press.

Murthy, R. S., & Lakshminarayana, R. (2006). Mental health consequences of war: A brief review of research findings. World Psychiatry, 5, 1, 25030.

**Musisi, S., & Kinyand, E. (2020).** Long-Term Impact of War, Civil War, and Persecution in Civilian Populations – Conflict and post-traumatic stress in African communities. *Frontiers in psychiatry*, 11, 20.

Pearce, E., Stringer, C., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2013). New insights into differences in brain organization between Neanderthals and anatomically modern humans. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B*, 280: 20130168.

**Raam Kumar, T., & Balasubramaniam, P. (2020).** Psychosocial Impacts of War and Trauma in Temsula Ao's 'Laburnum for My Head'. Rupkatha Journal on Interdisciplinary Studies in Humanities, 12, 5.

Rathi, A. (n.d.). Psychological Impact of Victims of War and Conflict. American Psychological Association.

Reich, W. (1933, 1973). Character Analysis. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Somasundaram, D. (2006). The Tragedy of War. World Psychiatry, 5, 1, 36-38.

Taylor, S. (2014). Why do human beings keep fighting wars? The Guardian, August 5, 2015.

Turney-Hugh, H. H. (1949). Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

Wilkinson, H. (1998). Editorial: war, and peace, and sheer confusion. *International Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 213–219.